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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the influence of neo-liberalism accelerating 
globalization on society, specialy on social cohesion in Japan. The Japanese Government 
begins to feel that social cohesion is in damage or crisis. ‘The White Paper on National 
Lifestyle’ issued by the Cabinet Office of Japanese Government in 2007 warned that the safety 
and security of Japanese society was threatened because social ties were weakening. Then, 
why is social cohesion now weakening in Japan? I conclude here that income differentials, 
and especialy the fixation of them after the crisis of Fordism are the most serious factors 
related in breakdown of social cohesion. That is because the fixation of income differentials 
brings about the fixation of social strata in a society, shatering the hopes of the lower group 
to rise to upper strata in the future and producing feelings of isolation among groups. 
　And then what results in income differentials and the fixation of them? It is the dualism of 
labour market. It means that the non-regular workers are divided from regular workers 
clearly by wages, employment conditions and social benefits, and that non-regular workers 
are generaly very difficult to move to the position of regular workers. Unfortunately, 
Japanese society is now polarizing through income inequality caused by employment 
differentials. Thus polarization of society that means hopeless society to economicaly- and 
socialy-excluded people, in turn, is bringing a crisis of social ties or social cohesion. A new 
mode of regulation about employment has to be discovered in place of the neo-liberal mode 
of regulation based on market competition.
Keywords: Income differentials, employment differentials, the fixation of income 
differentials, the fixation of employment differentials, the polarizing society, neo-liberalism, 
social cohesion
1. Introduction
　　The process of globalization has led to a much greater integration of the world economy. 
It has been accelerated by the flow of trade, capital, labor, technology and information across 
national borders since 1980s. As is wel known, popular writings often depicted that 
globalization is driven simply by technological innovation, or neutral market forces and other 
inescapable forces. This insistence, however, is not right. The contemporary phase of 
globalization is mainly an outcome emerged from the global consolidation and diffusion of the 
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economic strategy paradigm caled neo-liberalism, which emphasizes that the competitive 
adjustment in the market among economic actors makes the economic system the most 
efficient. This neo-liberalism has given a big impact on economic and social system in most 
countries. It, however, needs to be recognized that neo-liberalism has not encouraged to their 
convergence, but each country responds to it in a specific way and its impact on economic 
and social system is diverse. At the same time, we must recognize that each country shares a 
common experience of globalization on society.
　　The aim of this paper is to analyze the influence of neo-liberalism on society, specialy, on 
social cohesion in Japan. It is now becoming the most serious problem in Japan. The 
Japanese Government begins to feel that social cohesion is in damage or crisis. ‘The White 
Paper of National Lifestyle’ issued by Cabinet Office of Japanese Government in 2007 warns 
that safety and security of the Japanese society is threatened because social ties are 
weakening. It reports that cohesive networks among citizens in the community, cooperative 
relationships between employees and employer and among employees in the workplace and 
intimate parents-children relationships within the family are now changing and weakening. 
And it reports that social ties in society as a whole, so-caled ‘social cohesion’ according to 
the perspective of the EU, are in danger. The White Paper, however, does not analyze the 
reason why social ties are now weakening and how such a weakness gives an impact on 
society. As far as the influence on society is concerned, it is easy to provide an image. For 
example, World of Work report 2008 issued by ILO mentions that empirical research confirms 
the positive relationship between a weakness of social cohesion through income inequality 
and the crime rate. The low level of social ties can be generaly acknowledged as a part of 
the causes of increasing crime. It is also seen as one of the reasons why chauvinist 
movements become gradualy stronger in EU.
　　I am afraid the Japanese society wil have the same situation in the near future. Broadly 
speaking, a strong degree of social cohesion secures the safety of society. It is wel known 
that strong families which have intimate parent-child relationships are the core of a cohesive 
community and this cohesive community produces good and sound democracy, and that a 
cooperative workplace realizes the high level of firm’s productivity, and that cooperative 
economic relations result in a good economic performance. Thus political and economic 
climates are also preconditions for strengthening social cohesion and making society safe. 
Then, why is social cohesion now weakening in Japan? Though the answer is not simple, R. 
Putnam’s concept of social capital is highly suggestive for us when considering what social 
cohesion is and why social cohesion is weakening. I, however, claim a different conclusion 
from his one as the reason why social cohesion is weakening in Japan. By the way, I confirm 
to use the concept of social cohesion in similar meanings to social ties and social capital in 
advance because these concepts are based on trust and reciprocity in common.
　　Although there are various arguments, I conclude here that income differentials, and 
especialy the fixation of them which arise from flexibilization or diversification of 
employment are the most serious factors related in breakdown of social cohesion. That is 
because the fixation of income differentials brings about the fixation of social strata in a 
Ritsumeikan Social Sciences Review（Vol 46. No.1）124
society, shatering the hopes of the lower group to rise to upper strata in the future and 
producing feelings of isolation among groups. I cal such a society as ‘Polarizing Society’. In 
recent years, there is an argument that cals the Japanese society as ‘the society of hope 
differentials’, which is a society in which the lower group feels hopeless and thus society is 
not safe. I agree with this claim, because hope differentials lead to a sense of unfairness and 
fatalism. And a sense of unfairness can reduce people’s trust, which Putnam recognized as a 
factor making up social capital, and therefore threatens the safety of a society.
　　This paper consists of three parts. Firstly I depict the reality of widening income 
differentials, and its fixation in Japan. Secondly I describe the diversification of employment 
leads to income inequality and its fixation, and explain the reasons why such diversification is 
emerging. Further, I explain that the introduction of a neo-liberal strategy since the 90s in 
Japan is an important factor. Thirdly, I conclude that the reality of ‘Polarizing Society’ and 
selfishness, which neo-liberalism produces break down social capital, or social cohesion 
consisting of trust and reciprocity, referring to Putnam’s argument.
2. Unequal Society is Appearing
2―1 Income inequality
　　There are different measures of income inequality. Al seek to assess the distribution of 
income among individuals or households. Here we use Gini coefficients and the poverty rate.
　　The number of literatures on the rising level of inequality is growing in Japan. OECD 
warned that income inequality and relative poverty in Japan was expanding to levels above 
the OECD average, in OECD Economic Surveys of Japan that was published in 2006 and 2008. 
Table 1 presents the Gini coefficients in the mid-80s, the mid-90s and 2000 for disposable 
income calculated on the basis of total households. The Gini coefficient is known generaly as 
a standard measure of income differentials or income inequality. 0 represents perfect equality 
and 1 perfect inequality.
　　Although up til the mid-90s the Gini coefficient for Japan had been lower than the 
average level of OECD 23 countries, it stood at 0.314 in 2000 and it exceeded the OECD 
average. We find that the Gini coefficient for Japan became the highest level alongside the 
USA, when compared to European countries (except Italy and UK), specialy when compared 
to North European countries. Japan can be now identified as one of countries characterized 
by a relatively high degree of inequality in income distribution. The Gini coefficient for Japan 
ranked ninth worst (tenth worst in 2005) and Japan was included in the group of the lowest 
level of income equality among the OECD 23 countries. This is a shocking fact for us, 
because this fact makes it clear that the public notion shared among people that Japan is an 
equal society has become a myth.
　　We focus on one of the indicators other than the Gini coefficient in order to argue about 
whether a society of inequality is appearing in Japan. How about the poverty rate in Japan? 
The relative poverty rate, which is defined as an income (disposable income) that less than 
50% of the median, with income adjusted for differences in household size, is also an 
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important measure to analyze income inequality. OECD Economic Survey of Japan compared 
also the poverty rate in OECD countries.
　　According to the Survey (Table 2), the relative poverty rate in working-age population 
increased from 11.9% of the total working age population in the mid-80s to 13.5% in 2000. 
These figures are higher than the OECD average of 7.8% in the mid-80s and of 8.46% in 2000 
respectively. We have another current statistics by OECD Society at a Glance 2009. If the 
poverty rate is calculated on income of total population, it reaches 14.9% in 2005. It should be 
noted that 14.9% is the fourth highest figure, that is, Japan has the fourth highest poverty 
rate among the main OECD countries, ranking after Mexico, Turkey and USA. This result 
suggests that unfortunately the poor are increasing in Japan. In fact the number of people 
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Table 1. Gini coefficiencies in OECD countries (Diposable income)
A. Total population
Level of Gini coefficientLevel of Gini coefficient
2000Mid-1990sMid-1980s2000Mid-1990sMid-1980s
0.3140.2950.278Japan0.3050.3050.312Australia
0.2610.2590.247Luxemblourg0.2520.2380.236Austria
0.4670.5080.439mexico0.3010.2830.29Canada
0.2510.2550.234Netherlands0.260.2580.232Czech Republic
0.3370.3310.27New Zeeland0.2250.2130.229Denmark
0.2610.2560.234Norway0.2610.2280.207Finland
0.3560.3590.329Portugal0.2730.2780.275France
0.2430.2120.198Sweden0.2750.2770.263Germany
0.4390.4910.435Turkey0.3450.3360.336Greece
0.3260.3120.287UK0.2930.2920.271Hungary
0.3570.3620.338U.S.A0.3040.3250.331Ireland
0.3070.3050.286Average0.3470.3480.306Italy
B. Working-age population
0.310.290.276Japan0.2950.2940.304Australia
0.250.2540.233Netherlands0.3050.2870.286Canada
0.330.3240.263New Zeeland0.2260.2140.22Denmark
0.260.2490.222Norway0.260.2340.205Finland
0.2420.2160.224Sweden0.2720.2770.267France
0.3190.3040.277United Kingdom0.2720.270.254Germany
0.3460.3510.326United States0.3450.3490.305Italy
0.2880.2790.262Average
Source: OECD (2006)
receiving the Public Assistance (Seikatsu 
Hogo in Japanese, or generaly caled income 
support program) that means the last resort 
in term of poverty relief is rising. The number 
is now more than 1 milion people although 
everybody who needs the support is not 
always covered by this income support 
program because of the tough means-test 
conducted by the Welfare Office.
　　The measures mentioned above show that 
income differentials in Japan are widening and 
inequality is growing larger in society. 
However, while some agree with these views, 
there are lots of critics of them. Most of them 
criticize these views as discussed above, 
concerning the high level of the Gini 
coefficient with the fact that Japan is a rapidly 
aging society. According to this criticism, the 
Gini coefficient for al age groups is affected 
largely by the Gini coefficient of the older 
group whose share among population is large 
and whose Gini coefficient is relatively high. 
They, therefore, emphasis that we shouldn’t 
overestimate the fact that the Gini coefficient 
in Japan is high compared to other OECD 
because it is natural that aging of society 
pushes the Gini coefficient to a higher level.
　　These criticisms seem to be unrealistic because lots of people feel the degree of 
inequality is now rising. It should be also noted that even the Gini coefficient for the working-
age population increased from 0.276 to 0.31 between the mid-80s and 2000. The rate of 0.31 
wasn’t so different from 0.314 for the total population but it is high in comparison to 0.288 of 
the OECD average. Similarly, the relative poverty rate for the working-age population was 
13.5% that was not largely different from 15.3% for the total population, but was also higher 
compared to 8.4% of the OECD average in 2000. In this way, criticism that income inequality 
is inevitable because Japan is a country in which society is aging and thus it shouldn’t be 
overestimated, lacks sufficient basis in research.
2―2 Fixation of inequality
　　We, Japanese people, live in an age of inequality where income and economic 
differentials are growing.
　　Also, the word, ‘poverty’, which had disappeared during the golden age, is reviving in 
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Table 2. Poverty rate (Disposable income, 
household income of working age 
population)
2000Mid-1990s
3.83Czech Republic
54.5Denmark
5.14.2Sweden
5.96.2Netherlands
66.8France
66.7Norway
6.45.4Finland
87.2Germany
8.67.5Australia
8.78United Kingdom
9.57New Zeeland
9.610Portugal
10.39.4Canada
11.512.7Italy
11.98.6Ireland
13.511.9Japan
13.713.5Umited States
8.47.8Average
Source: OECD (2006)
newspapers, journals, TV programs 
and academic articles, and we no 
longer feel that the word is strange. 
But the problem is not only the fact 
that income differentials are expanding, 
but also that they have begun to be 
fixed. This fact of the fixation of 
income differentials, to which has 
not been paid enough atention yet, 
must be emphasized because a 
society that is unequal and has low 
levels of social mobility results in the 
weakening of social cohesion.
　　Figure 1 presents the proportion of households remaining in the same income status 
(household income) one year later, showing two groups selected among quintile groups. We 
see that this proportion has been increasing. In particular, we should note that the remaining 
ratio for the first quintile group (the lowest income group) increases from 69.3% in 1994-1995 
to 78.6% in 2001-2002. It shows that it becomes difficult for members of the lowest income 
group to move to the upper groups. Although the remaining ratio for the fifth quintile group 
is a litle lower than the first quintile one, the mobility of this group is becoming low. Another 
survey conducted by The Institute for Research on Household Economics in 2003 (Figure 2) 
makes it clear that the degree of mobility among social strata is not so high. According to 
this panel survey, on the one hand, 50% of households who belonged to the first quintile 
group and were 25-35 years old in 1994 remained in the same quintile in 2002, and on the 
other hand, 51.9% of households in the fifth group remained in the same quintile in 2002.
　　It is obvious that a trend of ‘fixation’ of income differentials, and thereby one of 
immobility or fixation among social strata is developing. Moreover, it is also obvious that this 
fixation is likely to be inherited from generation to generation. A high educational career is 
needed to get good jobs and high income in the current knowledge society. And a door to a 
high educational career is not always open to al young people. It is reported that more than 
70% of parents of students who atend one of top-rank universities in Japan, belong to the fifth 
group. On the contrary, the possibility to get a high educational career is lower for young 
people whose parents belong to a lower group. A position in social strata tends to be 
transmited through the generations.
　　Income differentials are expanding and the fixation of social strata is now going on in 
Japanese society. I name it a ‘polarizing society’. Then, we need to analyze why income 
differentials are widening and why they are fixed in Japan. I shal show that employment 
differentials result in income differentials and that the fixation of employment differentials 
result in the fixation of income differentials in next section.
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Figure 1. Proportion of household remaining in the 
same income status (household income)
Source: Sakaguchi (2004)
3. Change of labor market
3―1 Neo-liberal Response to the crisis of Fordism
　　There are some factors responsible for the rising level of disposable income differentials 
since the mid-80s. As some claimed above, it is sure that population aging is one of factors 
that contribute to higher inequality in disposable income. Nevertheless, it should be 
confirmed that income inequality among the working-age population is a key factor of the rise 
in income inequality as a whole. Labor flexibility has played a central role as the key factor to 
increase income differentials as wel as the cut-down of welfare budget.
　　Labor flexibility is not a neutral term but a slogan of neo-liberalism which is pushing 
globalization. We know that Fordism, which led societies after World War Ⅱ to economic 
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Figure 2. Changes of Annual Income in the Same Family Unit 
From 1993 to 2002 who belongs to the First and 
Fifth Group
Note 1: The above date is Average annual income (total 110 
family units)
Note 2: milion yen (unit)
Source: Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (2003)
booms, fel into a crisis in the 70s. In response to this crisis, many countries started on the 
road towards neo-liberalism in the 80s, because globalization or global competition forced 
them to adopt this neo-liberal strategy. Japan was not also an exception. The Japanese 
government’s response to this crisis was to pursue mainly a Keynesian policy of aggressive 
public investment. Although this policy was successful, it resulted in an economic bubble. 
And after the economic bubble of the late 1980s burst, the Japanese economy experienced 
such a serious and deep recession that was caled the ‘lost decade’, as other countries had 
already done in the 80s after the crisis of Fordism. The government launched fuly into the 
road towards neo-liberalism in 1995 in response to this recession. While this strategy was 
chosen voluntarily under the serious economic recession and global competition by Japanese 
government and economic actors in Japan, it was promoted under the pressure put by 
American economic actors who pushed them to take this strategy. This strategy consisted of 
a set of structural reforms, deregulations, privatizations, tax reductions, cut-off of the welfare 
budget, establishment of minimum state and promotion of labor flexibility. Neo-liberalism 
came to Japan 10-15 years later than the other countries.
　　Arguments on labor flexibility, however, had started already in the mid-80s. The 
Japanese style of the Fordist mode of regulation between capital and labor is not 
characterized by a compromise about wages, but one about employment, differently from the 
Atlantic-Fordism. While stability of employment was a more serious concern for labor rather 
than a high level of wage, long-term employment was also needed for capital to train up and 
keep high-skiled workers. On the one hand, labor compromised on a moderate level of wage 
and the same level of wage in the same age and career group, which is caled seniority-based 
wage system. On the other hand, labor wanted strongly to compromise on long-term 
employment which means workers work long as regular workers in the same company. 
These types of compromises between labor and capital are caled the Japanese type of 
industrial relations, and they drove Japan into ‘golden age’ and reduced the damages of the 
crisis of Fordism on economic performance, together with other modes of regulation specific 
to Japan such as intimate and long inter-firm relationships and so forth.
　　Globalization, which neo-liberalism pushed, however, hits this Japanese style of Fordism, 
especialy the employment system. Capital was forced by global competition to break 
compromises between capital and labor in order to cut the labor cost, claiming labor 
flexibility. This means that wage and employment should not be regulated by institutionalized 
compromises, but by the free competition of markets which is a belief of neo-liberalism. 
Various types of employment, so-caled diversification of employment are emerging, and was 
recognized as a key policy response to neo-liberalism, a trend accelerated from the mid-90s. 
However, it had started practicaly in the mid-80s when the Japan Federation of Employer’s 
Associations decided unilateraly, without an agreement with the unions, to move to a new 
employment system characterized by the diversification of employment as stated in its report 
named ‘Japanese Style of Management in a New Age’ in 1995. In this report the form of 
employment is categorized into 3 types, which are core workers (regular workers based on 
the traditional type of employment, professionals (under individual contract), and peripheral 
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workers (non-regular workers). This report declared formaly that the diversification of 
employment should be promoted in companies and government should support this policy, 
departing from traditional compromises on employment between capital and labor. After this 
report, the number of non-regular workers has been expanding, being excluded from social 
security and a reasonable level of wage.
　　In this way, the age of neo-liberalism has started fuly in the mid-90s as a response to 
the crisis of Fordism, and it came to Japan 10 years later compared to other countries that 
had experienced it in the 70s. It is the diversification of employment that is a key factor 
causing income differentials or inequality in income. Up til the mid-80s, Japan had 
experienced an equal society, being based on the Japanese type of wage and employment 
system, which means compromises between capital and labor specific to the Japanese style of 
Fordism. People had felt themselves to belong to the middle-income class or middle class. 
After the mid-90, however, it is becoming a myth.
3―2. Labor market dualism
　　Figure 3 shows the fact that the number of non-regular workers is increasing steadily. 
The proportion of non-regular workers rose from 16.4% in 1985 to 33.7% in 2007, two-thirds of 
which are women. Consequently, more than half of female employees are non-regular 
workers. Non-regular workers, and their situations, are characterized as folows; firstly, they 
are in unstable employment because non-regular workers, who consist of part-time workers 
who work less than 35 hours a week, dispatched workers who are employed by temporary 
workers agencies and temporary and short-time contract employees, are not secured by long-
term employment; secondly, there is a major difference in social insurance coverage. Less 
than half of non-regular workers are covered by employee’s pension and health insurance. 
Even employment insurance covers just two-thirds of them. These facts means that their 
health is threatened and that the probability which they could enjoy the average level of life 
in the future is low if the support by social security is inadequate; thirdly, non-regular 
workers are given no chance of occupational training or skils training. They, therefore, lose 
opportunities for a career path in their work places or to make other careers; fourthly, the 
number of non-regular workers is increasing even in the young generation between 15-34 
years. This is a big problem for the future of the Japanese society; fifthly, it should be noted 
that the wage differentials between regular workers and non-regular workers are not as smal 
as figures show. There is an approximately 60% gap between the average hourly wages of 
regular and non-regular workers. Such wage differentials in 35-44 years old group are a 
serious problem because educational costs for their children grow higher in this age-group; 
sixthly, in addition, it is reported that non-regular workers tend to be less married and it, 
therefore, is one of the main reasons for a downward trend in the birthrate.
　　The growing proportion of non-regular workers and their lower level of wage compared 
with regular workers are key explanations of increasing income inequality. Namely, Japan has 
become one of the countries where neo-liberalism is most successful in achieving 
employment flexibility caled numerical one in general. As a result, income inequality is 
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widening (cf., Figure 3, 4, 5).
　　At the same time, it should be pointed out that wage flexibility that is emerging among 
regular workers has also contributed to the widening of income differentials. Although the 
wage system in Japan is more flexible than in other countries because of bonuses, that make 
up to 20-30% of the total annual wage, suggesting a certain proportion of profit is distributed 
to their employees, now they are becoming stil more flexible due to the introduction of the 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Non-Regular workers by age group1)
Figure 4. Differences of wage curve by the form of employment
Source: ibid
performance-related wage system. The level of wages is determined by individual 
performance, reflecting the company’s performance. And the wage seting system is also 
changing towards decentralization and individualization due to the introduction of the 
performance-related wage system. Unions no longer know how much each person is paid in 
wages. Some surveys report that the difference of wages based on performance appraisal is 
not smal. While this wage system is now criticized because it is difficult to evaluate and 
compare performance of employees, it has been introduced in various ways into most 
companies. Thus wage flexibility is also one of the reasons for widening income differentials. 
In addition, the performance-related wage system causes stress of employees because it 
strengthens competition and reduces cooperative feelings among employees.
　　We can confirm that a new type of labor market dualism is now going on in Japan, and 
diversification of employment causes income differentials. To be sure, ‘labor market dualism’ 
is not new, because Japan has experienced a dualistic labor market that was segmented 
between large companies and medium-smal companies. The current labor market dualism, 
however, differs from the traditional one, because it is promoted by a strategy of neo-
liberalism that aims to widen wage differentials themselves.
　　Finaly, it should be emphasized that the fixation of employment differentials, or a new 
labor market dualism, is occurring. Currently, it becomes very difficult for non-regular 
workers to become regular workers no mater how much they hope to get such a regular job 
position. In particular, once a high school graduate starts to work as a non-regular worker 
after graduation, then it is unlikely that he or she wil move to a regular job position 
afterwards. According to a 2006 survey by the government, 55.4% of non-regular workers 
(they are caled ‘freeter’ in Japan) between the age of 15 and 34 who changed jobs were 
forced to remain in the same job status. In this way, a dualistic labor market accompanies 
now the limited mobility between the segments of the labor market.
　　We would like to cal this situation ’the fixation of employment differentials’. In recent 
years, it should be recognized that labor market dualism does not only mean the 
diversification of employment, but it also includes the fixation of employment differentials. 
Moreover it should been pointed out that employment differentials cause income differentials 
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Figure 5. Wage differentials between regular workers and non-
regular workers (as percentage of wage of regular 
workers)
Source: ibid
and their fixation, namely the fixation of social strata. It is known that market income 
differentials in OECD countries are not so low when compared to Japan. Notwithstanding, as 
to disposable income differentials, those countries keep in a lower level than Japan. Its reason 
is clear because they are implementing effective tax and social spending policies in order to 
reduce disparities in the distribution of market income (initial income), and active educational 
and labor market policies in order to promote mobility in labor market. Although such 
policies play a significant role in reducing disparities in the distribution of market income, 
conversely the Japanese government is cuting the welfare budget, claiming minimum state, 
privatization of welfare and the principle of self-responsibility or family-responsibility.
4. Crisis of Social Cohesion in the Polarizing Society
4-1 Social cohesion and ‘hope’
　　We have provided a picture of the inequalities in employment and income in the above 
section. Unfortunately, Japanese society is now polarizing through income inequality caused 
by employment differentials. Thus polarization of society, in turn, is bringing a crisis of social 
ties or social cohesion. Needless to say, there are some factors that bring the crisis of social 
cohesion in addition to income inequality. The individualization of society is also one of other 
factors. Moreover, the norm of selfishness that is inherent in neo-liberalism has a serious 
influence on the breakdown of social cohesion, as wel as growing ethnic troubles due to the 
increase in the number of immigrants. Yet, we claim that income inequality and its fixation, 
which cause the polarizing society, are the most important factors. Thus, in Japan social 
cohesion is weakening.
　　Then, what is the problem as to the crisis of social cohesion, and why does the 
polarizing society lead to a crisis of social cohesion? These questions need to be answered 
here. In sum, it could be pointed out that the crisis of social cohesion does not make society 
safe. Moreover, some arguments note rightly that it damages a good economic performance 
as wel as sound democracy. And other arguments assert that it results in the increase in 
crime and political terrorism. I agree with these arguments. In addition to them, we must 
take notice that polarizing society produces chauvinists who inflame hostility and conflict 
towards immigrants. Fascism is not a monster that has for ever faded into history.
　　The answer to the second question is as folows. Polarizing society means hopeless 
society to economicaly- and socialy-excluded people. I consider ‘hope’ as a background or 
precondition to maintain social cohesion. Although it doesn’t produce social cohesion directly, 
at least it is requirements for developing and maintaining social cohesion based on the 
generalized trust in others as related below. Then how is ‘hope’ defined, and what conditions 
are needed to realize it?
　　We define such positive mental state that people might feel when ‘possibility of choice’ is 
ensured equaly to them al, as ‘hope’. People are existences who have the ability to choose 
what people can be and can do. And they wil be likely to feel happy, if their ‘capability’ is 
realized, or the possibility for realizing it is provided. On the contrary, people wil feel 
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disappointed when doors toward such a possibility are shut. Speaking briefly, possibility of 
choice is largely different from freedom of choice that is a key principle of neo-liberalism. 
Neo-liberalism ignores that there are people who can’t stand on the same start line of life in 
the first place as others do, in other words who are excluded even from the state of ‘freedom 
of choice’. Therefore, the concept of ‘hope’ connects strongly with possibility of choice. 
Polarizing society excludes people who are vulnerable economicaly out of society and derive 
possibility of choice from them. Thereby ‘hope’ are also derived from them. One researcher, 
correctly, names the current society as a society of ‘hope’ differentials.
4-2 Income inequality and social cohesion
　　─from the perspective of social capital─
　　As mentioned above, the society with ‘hope’ is a key precondition to maintain social 
cohesion. ‘Hope’, however, doesn’t produce social cohesion. It is merely a precondition of 
social cohesion. Then what produces and develops it? Although it is not an issue here to 
answer the question in detail, we can point out the folowing, referring to a vast amount of 
literature about social capital, because the concept of social cohesion can be argued from the 
perspective of social capital. Some commentatores put a focus on the realm of civil society as 
a source of social capital. They asserted that the more people are engaged in voluntary civil 
associations, the more trusting toward other people they wil become. Certainly, this is 
correct. Other commentators, on the other hand, claim that impartiality and fairness of 
welfare state foster the high level of generalized trust, criticizing arguments above and 
emphasizing that political institutions are also able to have a strong impact on the building of 
trust as wel as a mature civil society does. Though both arguments seem to be conflicting, 
both should be recognized to be important determinants of social capital together.
　　If social cohesion is able to be defined as ties among people based on trust and 
reciprocity like social capital, social cohesion is also build by both mature civil society and 
welfare state which pursues impartiality and fairness. I agree that both strongly relates to 
high level of generalized trust and reciprocity. We, however, watch at the reality that social 
cohesion is now in crisis under the current welfare state. In actuality, unless the welfare state 
reduces income inequality and resolves poverty issues, it might be difficult to maintain trust.
　　Our point here is that income equality doesn’t produce trust, but it is an absolutely 
necessary precondition to maintain trust because it expands the possibility of choice and 
provides the feelings of ‘hope’ to people. In this meaning, it serves as an important 
foundation for avoiding the crisis of social cohesion.
5. Conclusion
　　We have mentioned that the Japanese society is now polarizing due to the influences of 
globalization that is promoted under neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism believes in market 
freedom as the only principle to regulate interests among economic-social actors. It, however, 
operates against income equality and employment protection, and thereby it drives the 
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polarization of society. Moreover, this polarization of society leads social ties or social 
cohesion to the crisis. Unfortunately, the myth that Japanese society is equal and safe is 
colapsing.
　　Then, what should be done to respond to this crisis of social cohesion? In sum, above al, 
it is important that employment differentials should be resolved. Some commentators assert 
that the diversification of employment in the age of post-Fordism is inevitable, and that 
‘flexculity’ is worth considering as a concrete solution. I agree with these arguments. The 
Japanese government should learn ‘flexcurity’ policies.
　　A researcher mentions that the state can create trust by redistributing income and 
thereby realizing income equality, because economic equality is a decisive factor of trust. This 
argument seems to emphasize economic equality too much as a factor of trust and to 
overestimate the role of state to foster trust. As we have confirmed, it is a precondition for 
maintaining trust. The current problem, however, is that this precondition is now off. 
Therefore, the state has to play a positive role to make the precondition, because the state 
can set up policies for redistributing income and those for resolving employment differentials.
　　We know that we are in the society where it is difficult to realize ful employment. There 
are people who are excluded from the labor market in the first place, and thereby belong to 
the lowest group. It is also important for the state to support them.
　　At any rate, a new mode of regulation about employment has to be discovered in place of 
the neo-liberal mode of regulation based on market competition. Fortunately, we have now a 
big chance to change neo-liberal strategy, because neo-liberalism is facing criticism and 
because people feel fear for the damage on social cohesion that a ‘polarizing society’ makes.
　　What kind of globalization should we pursue, and what kind of society should we build? 
This is the question that we now face.
(This is based on the paper that was presented in the International Symposium at Chung-Anng 
University in Korea in 2008. I thank the participants of this symposium for giving me valuable 
comments, and also Prof. Tony Fielding at the Sussex University for checking my English paper.)
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